EXECUTIVE **21 AUGUST 2023**

SUBJECT:	**TREASURY MANAGEMENT AND PRUDENTIAL CODE – QUARTERLY UPDATE**
DIRECTORATE:	**CHIEF EXECUTIVE & TOWN CLERK**
REPORT AUTHOR:	**LAURA SHIPLEY, FINANCIAL SERVICES MANAGER**

1. Purpose of Report

1.1 The purpose of this report is to summarise and review the Council's treasury management activity and the prudential indicators at 30th June 2023.

1.2 CIPFA's new edition of the Code of Practice for Treasury Management (2021) recommends that Councillors should be informed of Treasury Management activities quarterly (previously twice a year). This report, therefore, ensures this Council is embracing best practice for the scrutiny of capital and investment activity in accordance with the Code of Practice (CIPFA).

2. Executive Summary

2.1 The Treasury Management position and performance results for the 3 months ended 30th June 2023 are set out in the body of the report & Appendix A (Prudential Indicators).

2.2 Approved limits - Officers can confirm that the approved limits within the Annual Treasury Management Strategy were not breached during the quarter ended 30th June 2023.

3. Background

3.1 The prudential system for capital expenditure is well established. One of the requirements of the Prudential Code is to ensure adequate monitoring of the capital expenditure plans, prudential indicators (PIs) and treasury management response to these plans. This report fulfils that requirement and includes a review of compliance with Treasury and Prudential Limits and the Prudential Indicators at 30th June 2023. The Treasury Management Strategy and Prudential Indicators were previously reported to and approved by Council on 28th February 2023.

3.2 This Council has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice for Treasury Management in the Public Sector and operates its treasury management service in compliance with this Code and the above requirements. These require that the prime objective of treasury management activity is the effective management of risk, and that its borrowing activities are undertaken in a prudent, affordable and sustainable basis.

3.3 This report highlights the changes to the key prudential indicators, to enable an overview of the current status of the capital expenditure plans. It incorporates any new or revised schemes previously reported to Members. Changes required to the residual prudential indicators and other related treasury management issues are also included.

4. Treasury Management Update

4.1 Investment Portfolio

4.1.1 The Council held £34.8m of investments as at 30th June 2023 achieving an average interest rate of 4.66% (2.10% 22/23). Actual interest earned in the 3 months period to 30th June 2023 totalled £0.43m.

4.1.2 Due to increases in the Bank of England base rate since budget setting, forecast interest income for the year is £1.494m (£0.525m General Fund & £0.969m HRA), exceeding the £0.475m budget set.

4.1.3 Of this investment portfolio 100% was held in low risk specified investments, the requirement for the year being a minimum of 25% of the portfolio to be specified investments. During the 3 month period to 30 June 2023, on average 100% of the portfolio was held in low risk specified investments and an average of 0% of the portfolio was held in non-specified investments (with other local authorities).

4.1.4 Where possible the council seeks sustainable investments and are working with our advisors on the best way to score banks and funds ESG ratings, whilst balancing this against generating returns that are in the best interest of the tax payer.

4.1.5 Liquidity – The Council seeks to maintain liquid short-term deposits of at least £5m available with a week's notice. At 30th June 2023 the Council held liquid short term deposits of £8.8m.

4.1.6 Security - The Council's maximum security risk benchmark for the portfolio as at 30th June 2023 was 0.009%, based on the historic risk of default of the counterparties and types of accounts in which the council's funds are place – this equates to a potential loss of £0.003m on an investment portfolio of £34.8m. This represents a very low risk investment portfolio.

4.1.7 Yield – The Council achieved an average return of 4.32% on its investment portfolio for the 3 months ended 30th June 2023. This is comparable to the average SONIA rate for the quarter, of 4.37%.

4.1.8 The table below highlights the level of investment activity and the rates obtained as at 30th June 2023. Investments were made in line with Link's approved counterparty list.

INVESTMENTS	PRINCIPAL £	RATE %	PERIOD DAYS
Goldman Sachs	3,000,000	4.22	181
Lloyds Bank Corporate Market - NRFB	2,000,000	4.25	181
SMBC Bank International Plc	2,000,000	4.20	181
Lloyds Bank Corporate Market - NRFB	3,000,000	4.31	181
Standard Chartered Bank Sustainable	3,000,000	4.35	181
London Borough of Barking and Dagenham	3,000,000	4.65	184

Lloyds Bank Corporate Market - NRFB	2,000,000	4.95	182
Close Brothers	2,000,000	4.90	186
Standard Chartered Bank Sustainable	2,000,000	5.23	183
SMBC Bank International Plc	2,000,000	5.22	183
Standard Chartered Bank Sustainable	2,000,000	5.40	182
Total Fixed Short Term Investments	**26,000,000**		
Aberdeen Liquidity Fund	1,800,000	4.43	Call
BNP Paribas	7,000,000	4.53	Call
Total Money Market Fund Investments	**8,800,000**		
Total Investments / Current Average Rate	**34,800,000**	**4.66**	

4.2 Borrowing

4.2.1 In accordance with the Local Government Act 2003, the Council has a statutory duty to determine and keep under review how much it can afford to borrow. Therefore, the Council establishes 'Affordable Borrowing Limits' (or Authorised Limit) as part of the Prudential Indicators within the approved treasury management strategy.

4.2.2 The 'authorised limit' and 'operational boundary' indicators govern the maximum level of external borrowing to fund the capital programme and short-term cash flow. See Appendix A.

4.2.3 At 30th June 2023 the Council held £114.35 million of external borrowing, of which 100% were fixed rate loans (See table below).

Borrowing Type	Lender	No of Loans	Outstanding Borrowing at 30.06.23 £	Ave Rate %
PWLB	PWLB	24	91,353,123	3.36
LA Borrowing	North Kesteven District Council	1	2,000,000	2.05
	South Yorks Mayoral	1	5,000,000	0.50
Market Loans	Barclays	4	10,000,000	4.24
	Commerzbank	1	4,500,000	5.05
	DEPFA	1	1,500,000	4.45
Total/ Ave Rate		32	114,353,123	3.42

4.3 Treasury Indicators

4.3.1

Maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing - upper and lower limits	Upper Limit %	Lower Limit %	Actual Limit %	Estimated position 31/03/24 £'000
Under 12 months	40%	0%	2%	2,225
12 months to 2 years	40%	0%	1%	1,128
2 years to 5 years	60%	0%	5%	5,723
5 years to 10 years	80%	0%	12%	13,184
10 years +	100%	10%	80%	86,983

Total				109,243

Limits for long-term treasury management investments	£7m

4.3.2 As at 30th June 2023, the average rate of interest paid during quarter 1 on external borrowing was 3.10%.

4.3.3 As part of the Treasury Management Strategy, the Council established a range of Prudential Indicators (in accordance with professional practice) to monitor both Treasury and Capital as the two are intrinsically linked. Details of the performance against the Prudential Indicators can be found at Appendix A. See comments below.

i. Capital Expenditure – Appendix A shows the revised estimates for capital expenditure that have been approved by or are subject to approval since the Council approved the original budget in February 2023.
ii. The Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) – Appendix A shows the Capital Financing Requirement, which is the Council's underlying need to borrow for a capital purpose. It also shows the expected debt position over the period (Operational Boundary).
iii. Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream – improved position anticipated due to increased interest rates generating higher returns.

4.3.4 The Council is currently under-borrowed against the CFR, as, whilst the Council has adequate cash balances and employs internal resources until cash flow forecasts indicates the need for additional borrowing or rates are available that reduce the cost of carrying debt. PWLB borrowing rates have increased and forecasts show that they will remain elevated for some while. Over £12.7m of borrowing is maturing in 2023/24 with a view to not being replaced in the current climate whilst interest rates remain high.

4.3.5 The HRA borrowing requirement is considered independently from that of the General Fund. Further borrowing is anticipated and will be reported as part of the MTFS and Treasury Management Strategy.

4.4 Economic Update

The current economic update from the Council's treasury advisors (LINK) can be found in Appendix B.

5. Strategic Priorities

5.1 One Council

Through its Treasury Management Strategy, the Council seeks to reduce the amount of interest it pays on its external borrowing and maximise the interest it achieves on its investments.

6. Organisational Impacts

6.1 Finance

The financial implications are covered in the main body of the report.

6.2 Legal Implications including Procurement Rules

The powers for a local authority to borrow and invest are governed by the Local Government Act 2003 (LGA 2003) and associated Regulations. A local authority may borrow or invest for any purpose relevant to its functions, under any enactment, or for the purpose of the prudent management of its financial affairs. The Regulations also specify that authorities should have regard to the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and the DLUCH Investment Guidance when carrying out their treasury management functions.

6.3 Equality, Diversity and Human Rights

The Public Sector Equality Duty means that the Council must consider all individuals when carrying out their day-to-day work, in shaping policy, delivering services and in relation to their own employees.

It requires that public bodies have due regard to the need to:

- Eliminate discrimination;
- Advance equality of opportunity;
- Foster good relations between different people when carrying out their activities.

Due to the nature of the report, there are no direct equality, diversity, or human rights implications.

7. Risk Implications

7.1 The Local Government Act 2003, the Prudential Code and the Treasury Management Code of Practice include a key principal that an organisations appetite for risk is included in their annual Treasury Management Strategy and this should include any use of financial instruments for the prudent management of those risks, and should ensure that priority is given to security and liquidity when investing.

8. Recommendation

8.1 Executive are asked to note the Prudential and Treasury Indicators and the actual performance against the Treasury Management Strategy 2023/24 for the quarter ended 30th June 2023.

Is this a key decision?	No
Do the exempt information categories apply?	No
Does Rule 15 of the Scrutiny Procedure Rules (call-in and urgency) apply?	No
How many appendices does the report contain?	Two
List of Background Papers:	Treasury Management Strategy 2023/24 (Approved by Council February 2023)
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Appendix A

PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS

Indicator No.	Indicator	2023/24 Original Estimate (OE) £'000	2023/24 OE inc. Year End Adj 's £'000	2023/24 Q1 Revised Estimate £'000
1 & 2	Capital Expenditure - General Fund	14,114	21,252	24,688
1 & 2	Capital Expenditure - HRA	16,462	22,174	17,969
3 & 4	Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) - General Fund	74,148	74,308	74,324
3 & 4	Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) - HRA	78,803	78,803	79,642
5	Actual External Debt	109,897	109,897	109,897
6	Gross Debt and the CFR – Under Borrowing	43,055	43,214	44,069
7	Operational Boundary for External Debt	121,097	121,097	121,097
8	Authorised Limit for External Debt	125,642	125,530	125,530
9&10	Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream - General Fund	14.35%		15.39%
9&10	Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream - HRA	28.33%		30.78%
11&12	Net Income from Commercial and Service Investments to Net Revenue Stream	10.82%		10.82%

Glossary Of Terms

The Authorised Limit – This represents the limit beyond which borrowing is prohibited and needs to be set and revised by members. It reflects the level of borrowing which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term. It is the expected maximum borrowing need with some headroom for unexpected movements. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003.

The Operational Boundary – This indicator is based on the probable external debt during the course of the year; it is not a limit and actual borrowing could vary around this boundary for short times during the year. CIPFA anticipate that this should act as an indicator to ensure the authorised limit is not breached.

Appendix B

Economic Update from LINK (the Council's treasury advisors)

The first quarter of 2023/24 saw:

- A 0.2% m/m rise in real GDP in April, partly due to fewer strikes;
- CPI inflation falling from 10.1% to 8.7% in April, before remaining at 8.7% in May. This was the highest reading in the G7;
- Core CPI inflation rise in both April and May, reaching a new 31-year high of 7.1%;
- A tighter labour market in April, as the 3myy growth of average earnings rose from 6.1% to 6.5%;
- Interest rates rise by a further 75bps over the quarter, taking Bank Rate from 4.25% to 5.00%;
- 10-year gilt yields nearing the "mini-Budget" peaks, as inflation surprised to the upside.

The economy has weathered the drag from higher inflation better than was widely expected. The 0.2% m/m rise in real GDP in April, following March's 0.3% m/m contraction will further raise hopes that the economy will escape a recession this year. Some of the strength in April was due to fewer strikes by train workers and teachers in that month. Moreover, some of the falls in activity in other areas in April were probably temporary too. Strikes by junior doctors and civil servants contributed to the fall in health output (0.9% m/m) and the meagre 0.1% m/m increase in public administration.

The fall in the composite Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) from 54.0 in May to a three-month low of 52.8 in June (>50 points to expansion in the economy, <50 points to contraction) was worse than the consensus forecast of 53.6. Both the services and manufacturing PMIs fell. The decline in the services PMI was bigger (from 55.2 to 53.7), but it remains consistent with services activity expanding by an annualised 2%. The fall in the manufacturing PMI was smaller (from 47.1 to 46.2), but it is consistent with the annual rate of manufacturing output falling from -0.8% in April to around -5.0%. At face value, the composite PMI points to the 0.1% q/q rise in GDP in Q1 2023 being followed by a 0.2% q/q gain in Q2 2023.

Meanwhile, the 0.3% m/m rise in retail sales volumes in May was far better than the consensus forecast of a 0.2% m/m decline and followed the robust 0.5% m/m rise in April. Some of the rise was due to the warmer weather. Indeed, the largest move was a 2.7% m/m jump in non-store sales, due to people stocking up on outdoor-related goods. But department stores also managed to squeeze out a 0.6% m/m rise in sales and the household goods sub-sector enjoyed a reasonable performance too. Overall, the figures were far better than analysts had expected. In addition, the GfK measure of consumer confidence rebounded from -27 to a 17-month high of -24 in June.

The recent resilience of the economy has been due to a confluence of factors including the continued rebound in activity after the pandemic, households spending some of their pandemic savings, and the tight labour market and government handouts both supporting household incomes. That said, as government support fades, real household incomes are unlikely to grow rapidly. Furthermore, higher interest rates will mean GDP is likely to contract later this year. Our central assumption is that inflation will drop to the 2.0% target only if the Bank triggers a recession by raising rates from 5.00% now to at least 5.5% and keeps rates there until at least mid-2024. Our colleagues at Capital Economics estimate that around 60% of the drag on real activity from the rise in rates has yet to bite, and the drag on the quarterly rate of real GDP growth over the next year may be about 0.2ppts bigger than over the past year.

The labour market became tighter over the quarter and wage growth reaccelerated. Labour demand was stronger than the consensus had expected. The three-month change in employment rose from +182,000 in March to +250,000 in April. Meanwhile, labour supply continued to recover as the size of the labour force grew by 303,000 in the three months to April. That was supported by a further 140,000 decline in inactivity as people returned to work from retirement and caring responsibilities (while inactivity due to long-term sick continued to rise). But it was not enough to offset the big rise in employment, which meant the unemployment rate fell from 3.9% to 3.8%

The tighter labour market supported wage growth in April, although the 9.7% rise in the National Living Wage on 1st April (compared to the 6.6% increase in April last year) probably had a lot to do with it too. The 3myy rate of average earnings growth reaccelerated from 6.1% to 6.5% (consensus 6.1%) and UK wage growth remains much faster than in the US and the Euro-zone. In addition, regular private sector wage growth increased from 7.1% 3myy to 7.6%, which left it well above the Bank's forecast for it to fall below 7.0%. Overall, the loosening in the labour market appears to have stalled in April and regular private sector wage growth was well above the Bank's forecast.

CPI inflation stayed at 8.7% in May (consensus 8.4%) and, perhaps more worryingly, core CPI inflation rose again, from 6.8% to a new 31-year high of 7.1%. The rise in core inflation built on the leap from 6.2% in March to 6.8% and means it is accelerating in the UK while it is slowing in the US and the Euro-zone (both fell to 5.3%). A further decline in fuel inflation, from -8.9% to -13.1%, and the second fall in food inflation in as many months, from 19.3% to 18.7%, explained why overall CPI inflation didn't rise. And the scheduled fall in the average annual utility price from £2,500 to £2,074 on 1st July means overall CPI inflation will probably ease in the coming months. But the problem is that the recent surge in core inflation and the reacceleration in wage growth shows that domestic inflationary pressures are still strengthening.

This suggests the Bank may have more work to do than the Fed or ECB. Indeed, the Bank of England sounded somewhat hawkish in the June meeting. This came through most in the MPC's decision to step up the pace of hiking from the 25bps at the previous two meetings. The 7-2 vote, with only two members voting to leave rates unchanged at 4.50%, revealed support for stepping up the fight against high inflation.

That said, the Bank has not committed to raising rates again or suggested that 50bps rises are now the norm. What it did say was that "the scale of the recent upside surprises in official estimates of wage growth and services CPI inflation suggested a 0.5 percentage point increase in interest rates was required at this particular meeting". Moreover, the Committee did not strengthen its forward guidance that any further rate hikes would be conditional on the data. However, it looks highly probable, given the on-going strength of inflation and employment data, that the Bank will need to raise rates to at least 5.5% and to keep rates at their peak until the mid-point of 2024. We still think it is only a matter of time before the rise in rates weakens the economy sufficiently to push it into recession. That is why instead of rising to between 6.00%-6.25%, as is currently priced in by markets, we think rates are more likely to peak between 5.50-6.00%. Our forecast is also for rates to be cut in the second half of 2024, and we expect rates to then fall further than markets are pricing in.

Growing evidence that UK price pressures are becoming increasingly domestically generated has driven up market interest rate expectations and at one point pushed the 10-year gilt yield up to 4.49% in late June, very close to its peak seen after the “mini-budget”. Yields have since fallen slightly back to 4.38%. But growing expectations that rates in the UK will remain higher for longer than in the US mean they are still more than 70 bps above US yields. While higher interest rates are priced into the markets, the likely dent to the real economy from the high level of interest rates is not. That’s why we think there is scope for market rate expectations to fall back in 2024 and why we expect the 10-year PWLB Certainty Rate to drop back from c5.20% to 5.00% by the end of this year and to 4.20% by the end of 2024.

The pound strengthened from $1.24 at the start of April to a one-year high at $1.26 in early May, which was partly due to the risks from the global banking issues being seen as a bigger problem for the US than the UK. The pound then fell back to $1.23 at the end of May, before rising again to $1.28 in the middle of June as the strong core CPI inflation data released in June suggested the Bank of England was going to have to raise rates more than the Fed or ECB in order to tame domestic inflation. However, sterling’s strong run may falter because more hikes in the near term to combat high inflation are likely to weaken growth (and, hopefully, at some point inflation too) to such a degree that the policy rate will probably be brought back down, potentially quite quickly, as the economic cycle trends downwards decisively. This suggests that additional rate hikes are unlikely to do much to boost the pound.

In early April, investors turned more optimistic about global GDP growth, pushing up UK equity prices. But this period of optimism appears to have been short-lived. The FTSE 100 has fallen by 4.8% since 21st April, from around 7,914 to 7,553, reversing part of the 7.9% rise since 17th March. Despite the recent resilience of economic activity, expectations for equity earnings have become a bit more downbeat. Nonetheless, further down the track, more rate cuts than markets anticipate should help the FTSE 100 rally.

MPC meetings 11th May and 22nd June 2023

- On 11th May, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) increased Bank Rate by 25 basis points to 4.50%, and on 22nd June moved rates up a further 50 basis points to 5.00%. Both increases reflected a split vote – seven members voting for an increase and two for none.
- Nonetheless, with UK inflation significantly higher than in other G7 countries, the MPC will have a difficult task in convincing investors that they will be able to dampen inflation pressures anytime soon. Talk of the Bank’s inflation models being “broken” is perhaps another reason why gilt investors are demanding a premium relative to US and Euro-zone bonds, for example.
- Of course, what happens outside of the UK is also critical to movement in gilt yields. The US FOMC has already hiked short-term rates to a range of 5.00%-5.25%, but a further increase is pencilled in for July, whilst the ECB looks likely to raise its Deposit rate at least once more to a peak of 3.75%, with upside risk of higher to come.

<u>Interest rate forecasts</u>

The Council has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisors and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The PWLB rate forecasts below are based on the Certainty Rate (the standard rate minus 20 bps) which has been accessible to most authorities since 1st November 2012.

The latest forecast, made on 26th June, sets out a view that both short and long-dated interest rates will be elevated for some little while, as the Bank of England seeks to squeeze inflation out of the economy, against a backdrop of a stubbornly robust economy and a tight labour market.

Forecasts have steadily increased during the quarter as the data continued to spring upside surprises, and the Bank of England continued to under-estimate how prevalent inflation is, and how tight the labour market is. The Government has also noted that despite immigration increasing markedly, high levels of ill-health amongst the workforce has led to wage demands remaining strong until such time as there is a loosening in demand for business services.

Our current and previous PWLB rate forecasts below are based on the Certainty Rate.

Link Group Interest Rate View	26.06.23												
	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25	Jun-25	Sep-25	Dec-25	Mar-26	Jun-26
BANK RATE	5.00	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.25	4.75	4.25	3.75	3.25	2.75	2.75	2.50	2.50
3 month ave earnings	5.30	5.60	5.50	5.30	5.00	4.50	4.00	3.50	3.00	2.70	2.60	2.50	2.50
6 month ave earnings	5.80	5.90	5.70	5.50	5.10	4.60	4.00	3.50	3.00	2.70	2.60	2.60	2.60
12 month ave earnings	6.30	6.20	6.00	5.70	5.30	4.80	4.10	3.60	3.10	2.80	2.70	2.70	2.70
5 yr PWLB	5.50	5.60	5.30	5.10	4.80	4.50	4.20	3.90	3.60	3.40	3.30	3.30	3.20
10 yr PWLB	5.10	5.20	5.00	4.90	4.70	4.40	4.20	3.90	3.70	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.40
25 yr PWLB	5.30	5.40	5.20	5.10	4.90	4.70	4.50	4.20	4.00	3.90	3.80	3.80	3.70
50 yr PWLB	5.00	5.10	5.00	4.90	4.70	4.50	4.30	4.00	3.80	3.60	3.60	3.50	3.50

- LIBOR and LIBID rates ceased at the end of 2021. In a continuation of previous views, money market yield forecasts are based on expected average earnings by local authorities for 3 to 12 months.
- The Link forecast for average earnings are averages i.e., rates offered by individual banks may differ significantly from these averages, reflecting their different needs for borrowing short-term cash at any one point in time.

A summary overview of the future path of bank rate

- Our central forecast for interest rates was previously updated on 25th May and reflected a view that the MPC would be keen to further demonstrate its anti-inflation credentials by delivering a succession of rate increases. This has happened to a degree, especially as it moved to a more aggressive 0.5% hike in June but, with inflation remaining elevated, we anticipate that Bank Rate will need to increase to at least 5.5%, if not higher, to sufficiently slow the UK economy and loosen the labour market.
- Moreover, we also still anticipate the Bank of England will be keen to loosen monetary policy when the worst of the inflationary pressures are behind us – but timing on this will remain one of fine judgment: cut too soon, and inflationary pressures may well build up further; cut too late and any downturn or recession may be prolonged. Our current judgment is that rates will have to increase and stay at their peak until the second quarter of 2024 as a minimum.
- In the upcoming months, our forecasts will be guided not only by economic data releases and clarifications from the MPC over its monetary policies and the Government over its fiscal policies, but also international factors such as policy development in the US and Europe, the provision of fresh support packages to support the faltering recovery in China as well as the on-going conflict between Russia and Ukraine and whether there are any further implications for Russia itself following the recent aborted mutiny by the Wagner group.
- On the positive side, consumers are still estimated to be sitting on excess savings left over from the pandemic, which could cushion some of the impact of the above challenges and may be the reason why the economy is performing somewhat better at this stage of

the economic cycle than may have been expected. However, most of those excess savings are held by more affluent people whereas lower income families already spend nearly all their income on essentials such as food, energy, and rent/mortgage payments.

PWLB Rates

- Gilt yield curve movements have shifted upwards, especially at the shorter end of the yield curve since our previous forecast but remain relatively volatile. PWLB 5 to 50 years Certainty Rates are, generally, in the range of 4.90% to 5.60%.
- We view the markets as having built in, already, nearly all the effects on gilt yields of the likely increases in Bank Rate and the elevated inflation outlook.

The balance of risks to the UK economy: -

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is to the downside.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates include: -

- Labour and supply shortages prove more enduring and disruptive and depress economic activity (accepting that in the near-term this is also an upside risk to inflation and, thus, the rising gilt yields we have seen of late).
- The Bank of England increases Bank Rate too fast and too far over the coming months, and subsequently brings about a deeper and longer UK recession than we currently anticipate.
- UK / EU trade arrangements – if there was a major impact on trade flows and financial services due to complications or lack of co-operation in sorting out significant remaining issues.
- Geopolitical risks, for example in Ukraine/Russia, China/Taiwan/US, Iran, North Korea, and Middle Eastern countries, which could lead to increasing safe-haven flows.
- A broadening of banking sector fragilities, which have been successfully addressed in the near-term by central banks and the market generally, but which may require further intervention if short-term interest rates stay elevated for longer than is anticipated.

Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates: -

- Despite the recent tightening by 0.5%, the Bank of England proves too timid in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to remain elevated for a longer period within the UK economy, which then necessitates Bank Rate staying higher for longer than we currently project.
- The pound weakens because of a lack of confidence in the UK Government's fiscal policies, resulting in investors pricing in a risk premium for holding UK sovereign debt.
- Longer-term US treasury yields rise strongly if inflation remains more stubborn than the market currently anticipates, pulling gilt yields up higher consequently.
- Projected gilt issuance, inclusive of natural maturities and QT, could be too much for the markets to comfortably digest without higher yields compensating.